The proliferation of bilateral and regional trade agreements has arguably been the main change to the international trading system since the end of the Uruguay Round in the mid1990s. We argue that investment discrimination plays a major role in this development.
Introduction
Over the last few decades foreign direct investments (FDI) have increased rapidly. In 2009, the foreign affiliates of 82,000 transnational corporations contributed no less than 11 percent of global gross domestic product (UNCTAD 2010b, xviii) . By contrast, in the early 1990s the number of transnational corporations stood at only 35,000 (UNCTAD 1992, 11) . Much of the recent growth in FDI has been driven by developing and transition countries, which accounted for about half of the global FDI inflows by 2010 and also increasingly are home countries of transnational corporations that invest abroad. Scholars have analyzed both the reasons for the growth of FDI and the consequences of this trend for economic growth, tax competition and the environment. Interestingly, however, relatively little attention has been devoted to the question whether the growth and global spread of FDI has consequences for countries' trade policies.
Taking up this question, we argue that the internationalization of production has been one of the driving forces of the spread of bilateral and regional trade agreements across the globe that has taken place in parallel to the growth in FDI. In particular, we maintain that protection against the loss of foreign direct investments (FDI) has been an important rationale for the pursuit of preferential trade agreements (PTAs). Such agreements may produce investment discrimination if they lead to a spread in tariffs on intermediate goods from PTA partner countries and from third countries or contain provisions that preferentially liberalize investment policies for partners to the agreement. Governments in excluded countries are likely to react to the costs imposed by investment discrimination on their internationally active firms. An agreement with the country in which investors face discrimination helps domestic firms by reestablishing the competitive situation that existed before the conclusion of the initial agreement. The expectation thus is for trade agreements to spread in parallel to the growth of FDI, with capital exporting countries signing agreements with capital importing countries that recently concluded an agreement with another capital exporting country. Our argument further suggests that a.) the investment discrimination effect should be strongest for dyads with a large amount of trade in intermediate goods and b.) PTAs with investment chapters should have a particularly large effect on third countries.
We test our argument quantitatively for 166 countries and a period of 18 years (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) . Using spatial econometric tools, we find strong support for our hypothesis and three corollaries. The results are very robust to various changes in operationalization and estimation techniques. Moreover, we show that the effect of investment discrimination is substantively important. Interestingly, these results show that the domestic demand for PTAs depends not only on the on the size of the country's outward stocks of FDI, but also on other countries signing PTAs. The policies adopted by different countries thus are interdependent because societal interests respond to the policies pursued by other countries. This result speaks to a growing literature on the diffusion of policies (see, for example, Elkins et al. 2006 ). Our paper also contributes to an emerging literature on the politics of FDI by highlighting the important role that the aim of protecting outward stocks of FDI (and not only of attracting foreign investments) plays in shaping countries' economic policies. In fact, we found little evidence that competition over the attraction of foreign investments plays a major role in the recent proliferation of PTAs. Finally, our results show that the design of PTAs matters. PTAs with investment provisions have a larger impact on third countries than PTAs without investment provisions.
Foreign Direct Investments and Preferential Trade Agreements
Companies invest abroad for one of three reasons: access to markets (market-seeking FDI), differences in factor prices and/or regulatory standards (efficiency-seeking FDI), and access to natural resources (resource-seeking FDI). Market-seeking FDI results from companies trying to get better access to a foreign market. In the manufacturing sector, such marketseeking FDI is likely if a country or trading entity has high tariffs on imports of manufactured goods or if the costs of transport of a good are very high. Market-seeking FDI is also important in the services sector, as the provision of many services depends on the geographic proximity between provider and consumer. For example, the provision of telecommunication services nearly always requires investments in infrastructure in the foreign market.
Differences in labor costs, production-related standards, political stability, and other locational advantages can drive efficiency-seeking FDI. Finally, resource-seeking FDI aims at the extraction and use of natural resources, including soil for agricultural production.
The past twenty years have seen a rapid increase in (stocks of) foreign investments (see Figure 1 ). 1 We use stocks in our analysis; however, the trend for flows is very similar to the one shown in Figure 1 , with the exception that values fluctuate more strongly over time, for example flows declined between 2000 and 2003. for the past few years, with member countries of the World Trade Organization (WTO) notifying that organization of no fewer than 15 new agreements in 2011. 3 Initially, most of these agreements were signed among geographically-close developed countries, especially in Europe. Increasingly, however, also countries outside of Europe and geographically-distant country pairs have participated in this wave of preferentialism in international trade (Dür et al. 2013 ). In fact, of the agreements notified in 2011, only one is purely located within Europe, and nine included countries from different continents.
The two trends for FDI stocks and PTAs thus share important similarities in terms of both monotonic growth and increasing globalization. Evidently, this correlation between the two developments alone is not sufficient to establish causality. There are, however, good theoretical reasons to expect a causal relationship between them. In fact, PTAs may be both a stimulus for further FDI (with companies drawn to countries with PTAs) and a reaction to an increase in FDI (with companies asking for a PTA after setting up production facilities in a country). Despite the theoretical plausibility of these relationships, only a relatively small number of studies have looked at the FDI-PTAs nexus.
On the one hand, a few studies argue that PTAs attract FDI inflows. The basic idea behind this argument is that to appeal to foreign investors, especially developing countries have "to provide certainty and credibility as to the direction of future policies and the economic environment more generally" (Fernández and Portes 1998, 217) . Countries may then use PTAs as a commitment and signaling device that serves as a guarantee to potential foreign investors that the host government will pursue efficient economic policies in the future (Motta and Norman 1996; Büthe and Milner 2008) . On the other hand, some studies have advanced the idea that the protection of outward investments may be a motivation behind the conclusion of PTAs (Manger 2009; Hicks and Johnson 2011 
Investment Discrimination and the Spread of Trade Agreements
We develop our argument in two steps: first, we show that PTAs can create investment discrimination and second we discuss why and how we expect foreign countries to react to this investment discrimination.
PTAs and Investment Discrimination
The creation of a PTA can impose costs on third countries through both trade diversion and investment discrimination. Trade diversion refers to the substitution of imports from outside the PTA with production from inside the PTA. It occurs when tariff reductions inside the PTA make firms located in the PTA more competitive relative to firms from third countries.
Investment discrimination takes place when investments from outside the trading zone are put at a disadvantage when compared to investments from within the zone. While trade diversion has received much scholarly attention (and also the effects of trade diversion on the spread of trade agreements), 4 investment discrimination has hardly been studied so far. The example of NAFTA shows how the two pathways to investment discrimination play out in practice. After entry into force of NAFTA, European investors in Mexico suffered from discrimination because they had to pay tariffs when importing intermediate products into Investment discrimination, however, may not necessarily lead to a reduction in aggregate investments from a third country in the preferential trading zone. In fact, investment discrimination may require a company to increase investments within the trading zone, for example to comply with rules of origin or to avoid paying high tariffs on inputs. The discrimination stems from the fact that in this process the company has to incur costs.
Moreover, a third country's aggregate FDI stocks in the preferential trading area may increase because of tariff jumping investments by companies that previously exported goods and services into this area or the attractions caused by a larger (and potentially more dynamic) market (Blomström et al. 2000) . We thus expect that while investment discrimination may not necessarily affect the volume of FDI, it has an impact on firms' markup. 9 The argument that we set out then is compatible with studies that suggest that at least some preferential trade areas have attracted FDI from third countries (see, for example, Büthe and Milner 2008) .
Foreign Countries' Reaction to Investment Discrimination
The creation of a PTA thus is likely to impose costs on third-country companies with investments inside the new trading zone. Even if the costs from FDI discrimination are not particularly large for an individual company, they are likely to exceed the costs from lobbying for firms with established access to decision-makers. We thus expect these companies to respond to the discrimination by increasing their lobbying effort and asking governments for help to re-establish a "level playing field". 10 Governments should be responsive to this lobbying because business support is important for them in several ways. 11 First, supportive business actors may share information with government actors that is essential for the formulation and implementation of policies (Hall and Deardorff 2006) . Such information may include information on market conditions, expected policy results and the amount of support or opposition to a policy. Second, supportive business may back the government in an election campaign, whereas non-supportive business is more likely to assist the opposition (Fordham and McKeown 2003) . Assistance can be given in form of campaign contributions and information that helps the reelection effort. Finally, the ability to delay investments or relocate production facilities endows business with structural power (Lindblom 1977 ). Since such investment decisions impact on a country's economic growth and the economy influences election outcomes, governments have an incentive to ensure that business refrains from using its structural power. Governments' policy of choice to respond to investment discrimination often is to sign a trade agreement with the member country of a PTA where domestic firms face discrimination. A PTA is preferable to a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) in this situation as only the former can offset the investment discrimination from the initial agreement by eliminating tariffs on intermediate goods, whereas BITs do not envisage tariff reductions.
Moreover, the investment provisions included in BITs tend to be less far-reaching than those contained in PTAs. 12 BITs mainly comprise provisions that protect investments, for example by guaranteeing compensation in cases of expropriation and the repatriation of profits. Few
BITs, by contrast, include provisions that liberalize foreign investors' access to a market.
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Only a new PTA that includes explicit investment provisions can thus re-establish a level playing field with respect to the admission, operation, and protection of foreign investments.
Obviously, signing such an agreement is not costless, as lower tariffs and better conditions for foreign multinational companies may hurt domestic import-competing firms. It is only when the pressure from exporters and internationally active firms outweighs these protectionist demands that a government will sign a trade agreement.
Summarizing this reasoning, our expectation is that a country's desire to sign a PTA with another country increases, the larger the investment discrimination that it faces in the other country's market. A trade agreement, however, can only be signed if at least two countries agree on its desirability; that is, one or more potential partner countries also need an incentive to sign the agreement. Our argument is that the probability of a PTA is highest, 
A Spatial Econometric Test of the Argument
We test our argument quantitatively on a database including 166 countries for a time period of 18 years (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) . The database includes all major countries for which data are available for the period under analysis (see the list of countries in the online appendix). We start our analysis in 1990, first, because the eighteen year period covered fully encompasses the most recent wave of regionalism. By contrast, only a small number of agreements were signed in the 1970s and 1980s. By extending our analysis to a period in which few agreements predict few agreements, we would bias the analysis in favor of our argument. Second, the availability and quality of FDI data is much worse for the time before 1990. Since our analysis starts in 1990, we drop country pairs from our analysis that already had a working trade agreement between them as of 1989. This is a result of our decision to only focus on the first agreement both revisions of an existing agreement and a new agreement replacing an existing one may follow a logic that is different from the logic of signing a first agreement.
To empirically capture our argument about the external impact of PTAs, we need to measure the potential for an agreement to discriminate against FDI from third countries.
According Building on these ideas, we calculate a vector of spatial weights (that is, a measure of the strength of the effect of a policy change in one unit on all other units) using the following equation:
where the subscripts A, B and so on denote countries, w is the weight for a directed dyad, FDI_out the outward stocks of FDI and FDI_in the inward stocks of FDI.
16
The term PTA is a dummy variable that captures whether a dyad signed a trade agreement between t-1 and t-5. Ideally, we would use a measure of the margin of preference for member countries (that is, the difference between most-favored-nation treatment and the treatment for members of the PTA) with respect to tariffs and investment provisions rather 16 Below we show that the results do not change if we split the two components of our spatial term and estimate them using an interaction term, as suggested by Neumayer and Plümper (2012) .
than a dummy variable in this equation. Unfortunately, the data that would be necessary to calculate this measure are not available and would be very difficult to collect. We partly compensate for this limitation by presenting and testing three corollaries of the argument below. Only considering agreements that were signed between t-1 and t-5 years makes sense for two reasons: on the one hand, lagging by one year helps us avoid simultaneity bias. On the other hand, it seems plausible that after some time companies that are not successful in getting a political solution will adapt to the new competitive situation. With their lobbying effort declining, governments "forget" about the issue. We check the robustness of our 5-year hunch in the empirical analysis below by running models with 3-year and 7-year cutoff points.
We divide the FDI inward and outward stocks of countries A and B by their respective GDP as we are interested in a measure of the importance of FDI outward and inward stocks relative to the size of the economy. 17 By contrast, we take the actual value for the outward FDI stocks of country C, as it clearly makes a difference for A if C is a large economy such as the U.S. or a smaller one such as Australia. In 2008, Australia and the U.S. had outward FDI stocks amounting to 19 percent and 22 percent of GDP, respectively. While these two values are very similar, in absolute terms the outward stocks of the U.S. were 16 times higher than those of Australia ($3,162 billion as compared to $195 billion).
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The spatial weight for the directed dyad BA is calculated equivalently:
17 The data are from UNCTAD 2010. The data only capture long-term foreign investments where the investor has the intention of exercising influence over the management of a company. Short-term investments in stock or money markets thus do not distort the data. We use FDI stocks rather than flows because the latter are subject to exogenous short-term fluctuations and because endogeneity (that is, the signing of a PTA having an effect on FDI) is a more severe problem when using flows rather than stocks. (2010) notation, we estimate the following equation:
where y ij,t indicates whether the undirected dyad encompassing countries i and j signed a trade agreement at time t, w ij,t-1 is the connectivity matrix as described above, ŷ ij,t-5 is the lagged dependent variable, which scores one if countries i and j formed a PTA over the previous five years, and w ij,t-1 * ŷ ij,t-5 is the resulting spatial term. 21 Moreover, x ij,t-1 are the values for the undirected dyad ij of a set of control variables that are lagged by a year to avoid contemporaneous correlation. Finally, ρ is the spatial autoregression parameter that gives the impact of the spatial term on the outcome variable, β is a coefficient, α is the constant, and ε ij,t is the error term. For the significance tests, we rely on Huber-White standard errors that can take account of possible heteroskedasticity or intra-group correlation of the data (Beck 2008) . 20 Below we show that the results do not change when relying on a Cox proportional hazard model (Table A8 in the Appendix). In fact, our probit model with cubic polynomials is virtually the same as a survival model (Beck et al. 1998 ).
The clustering of these standard errors by dyad, and the use of cubic polynomials as suggested by Carter and Signorino (2010) , allow us to account for time dependence. As a robustness check for this decision, we also employ bootstrap standard errors (see Table A9 in the Appendix).
The control variables that we include in the models capture important characteristics of the two countries that form a dyad and the context in which a dyad considers concluding an 
Findings
The findings are very supportive of our argument. In our main model, the variable capturing the effect of investment discrimination is strongly statistically significant and has the right sign (see Model 1 in Table 1 ). Our variable of interest also has a sizeable substantive effect. Table   1 ). The effect of the spatial weight term remains positive and statistically significant. The control variables also are remarkably similar to those reported for Model 1. According to this model, a move from a low to a high value on FDI Discrimination (mean minus/plus a standard deviation) increases the number of dyads signing a PTA by 83 [23, 163] . The model with dyadic stocks of FDI thus predicts a significantly larger effect of investment discrimination than the model with monadic FDI data. This result is encouraging as the operationalization of the dyadic model more closely approximates our theory than the one of the monadic model.
In the following, to further assess the empirical validity of our argument, we test three additional implications that we derive from our argument.
Trade in Intermediate Goods and the Spread of PTAs
A first implication of our model is that the FDI discrimination effect should be larger, the more two countries trade in intermediate goods (Corollary 1). This argument derives from our first pathway to investment discrimination discussed above, namely FDI discrimination that results from tariff differentials that negatively affect market-seeking and efficiency-seeking FDI. To test this argument, we add to the model an interaction term between FDI discrimination and a variable capturing the amount of trade in intermediate goods between the two countries (Intermediate). We used the Broad Economic Categories (BEC) classification of the United Nations (2002) to distinguish such trade. 24 The results of this model again are very supportive (see Model 3 in Table 1 ). The coefficient for the interaction term is positive and statistically significant. What is more, the effect is substantively important as shown in 
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Investment Chapters and the Spread of PTAs
Our argument also implies that agreements with substantive rules concerning foreign investments create greater pressure for excluded countries to sign a PTA than other agreements (Corollary 2). This is so because narrow agreements that do not contain explicit rules on investments can create investment discrimination only via intermediate tariffs,
whereas broad agreements produce discrimination through both tariffs and discriminatory investment provisions. We further expect that investment discrimination that is caused by investment provisions in trade agreements should motivate states to sign new trade agreements that also include investment provisions (Corollary 3). The reasoning here is that only explicit investment rules can protect foreign investments against the discrimination emanating from investment provisions. For example, we expect countries that suffered from investment discrimination owing to the North American Free Trade Agreement (which contained substantive FDI provisions) to sign PTAs with Mexico that include investment chapters, as did Costa Rica (1994) and Chile (1998).
We rely on a new dataset on the design of a large number of preferential trade agreements to test these corollaries (Dür et al. 2013 ). This dataset allows us to distinguish between agreements with and without substantive investment provisions. A substantive provision can be a national treatment or a most favored nation clause. Such provisions may be found in the services chapter of a PTA or a separate, NAFTA-type investment chapter.
Among the agreements that have substantive provisions are NAFTA, the U. Overall, Models 1 to 5 have offered significant support for the argument linking investment discrimination to the formation of PTAs.
Robustness checks
We have carried out a large number of checks to gauge the robustness of our findings.
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Endogeneity First, we control for endogeneity in our model, that is, the imminent signature of a PTA stimulating an increase in FDI stocks. We instrument our spatial variables, following advice by Franzese and Hays (2008) . In a regression without spatial term a good instrument z should be correlated with the variable to endogenize (in our case, this would be Wŷ), but not with the error term of the main model (Murray 2006) . Under the condition of cross-spatial endogeneity, the requirement is for z j not to affect y i . An ideal candidate for instrumenting Wy i is Wx i , where x i is a non-spatial regressor (Franzese and Hays 2008: 759) . To achieve this, we first use a spatial term that includes FDI stocks lagged by ten years in the connectivity matrix as instrumental variable. FDI stocks at time t-10 are good predictors of FDI at time t (the correlation is 0.6), but are weakly correlated with the error term (the correlation is 0.1), and thus are good instruments to deal with potential endogeneity.
Moreover, they are logically exogenous to the causal link we are interested in, namely the formation of a PTA ten years later. Baccini and Urpelainen (2013) show that negotiations of north-south PTAs last less than three years on average. Building on work by Jensen 2003, we also checked whether adding data from the human development index and natural resources as instruments in the first stage made a difference, but results are very similar. 28 We obtain similar results if we use Colony weighted by the connectivity matrix as instrument. We are unable to include both Alliance and Colony weighted by the connectivity matrix because they are highly correlated. 29 The correlation between FDI Discrimination and Alliance weighted by the connectivity matrix is 0.4, whereas the correlation between Alliance weighted by the connectivity matrix and the Cox-Snell residuals of Model 1 is 0.
30 These tests are carried out using IVREG2 in Stata 12.
diversion on FDI stocks lagged by 10 years and Alliance weighted by FDI Discrimination.
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Second, we obtain the predicted values from these regressions and place them on the righthand side of our model. Finally, we estimate again our main models with bootstrapped standard error (100 replications) to reduce correlation between the first stage and second stage.
The findings from the second stage of the instrumental variable model again support our argument (Model A1 in Table A5 ). The coefficient for investment discrimination is positive and statistically significant, while all other coefficients are similar to those reported for the other models. Importantly, the residuals from the first stage are not statistically significant in the second stage, confirming the validity of our instrument. As expected, the substantive effect that we predict based on this model is slightly smaller than for Model 1.
Nevertheless, a move from a low to a high value on the FDI discrimination variable (mean minus/plus a standard deviation) still increases the expected number of dyads signing a PTA per year by 16 [7, 24] . This indicates that our causal mechanism has substantial explanatory power even after controlling for endogeneity.
Other Operationalizalizations of the Spatial Term
Second, following Neumayer and Plümper (2012) , we split the main explanatory variable into two parts, one capturing the number of agreements signed with third countries and the FDI outward stocks of these third countries (FDI Discrimination I) and the other the outward and inward stocks of countries A and B respectively (FDI Discrimination II). We then interact these two terms in the model that we estimate. As expected, the coefficient on the interaction term is positive and statistically significant (see Model A2). In the appendix, we show 31 We note that both instruments are always statistically significant at the convectional level in the first stage of the regression.
graphically that the marginal effect of FDI Discrimination I turns positive as FDI Discrimination II increases (see Figure A3 ). Again, this result supports our argument. 
Other Model Specifications
Furthermore, we include year (Model A4 in the online appendix) and region (Model A5) fixed effects. Moreover, we treat the EU as a single actor (by taking the median spatial weight across all member countries as weight for the EU, see Models A6-A8). We also use the smaller of the two directed dyad values for the undirected dyad rather than taking the sum (Model A9) and vary the cut-off point to three (Model A10) and seven years (Model A11) respectively. We also include measures of spatial distance (spatial distance and spatial distance 2 ) in line with Baldwin and Jaimovich (2012) 
Conclusion
We have argued that the growth in FDI has had important consequences for international Our contribution to the growing literature on foreign direct investment policy thus is to
show that international cooperation in this field is not only driven by countries' desire to attract FDI, but also by their attempts at avoiding investment discrimination. Of relevance for the literature on PTAs, our paper provides ample evidence that modern trade agreements are about more than only trade. PTAs clearly also are a tool used by governments to influence FDI. Moreover, the scope of PTAs matters for the economic effects of the agreements. The design of PTAs, in turn, can again at least partly be explained as a result of competitive dynamics. If a similar competitive effect also influences other features of these agreements, we should expect an increasing convergence on a relatively comprehensive model for new trade agreements. That is, we should see always fewer agreements that are limited to trade in goods and an increasing share of new agreements that contain provisions relating to investments, trade in services, competition and other policy fields (as indeed we can observe, see Dür et al. 2013) .
On the broadest level, our paper speaks to a literature that sees international outcomes -even systemic ones, such as the new regionalism -as a result of a combination of domestic preference formation and strategic interaction in international negotiations (Oatley 2011) . 
